In 2023, political violence in Haiti remained tirelessly while the territorial differences in gangs continued to damage the country’s security landscape. While the overall levels of violence only increased slightly in 2023 compared to 2022, violence has become significantly more deadly: current 1,980 recordings reported deaths, which represents an increase of 39%. With gangs continuously seeking to strengthen their sources of income, they extended considerably to new areas, which caused new outbreak of violence in the metropolitan region of Port-au-Prince and in the larger department, in the Artibonite and beyond department. Faced with the lack of government’s ability to combat increased violence, 2023 has also seen an increase in self -defense activity, sending a disturbing signal for the generalization of violence within Haitian society. Despite the expected deployment of an international security force led by Kenya approved by the United Nations, the concerns of the security situation could worsen remain high, exacerbated by blocking negotiations between the interim government and the opposition on a means of getting out of the Haiti political crisis.
In the metropolitan region of Port-au-Prince, the war of the lawn in progress between the G-9 and G-Pèp of the gang alliances continued to fuel violence, especially in the municipalities of Port-au-Prince and the Cité Soleil. Territorial expansions of independent gangs have also significantly contributed to deadly violence. Gangs such as the Grande-Ravine and 5 seconds led the incursions to contest the control of the southern entrance to the capital, including in The Mariani district of Carrefour And The districts of Port-au-Prince and Carrefour Leaves. Meanwhile, in the eastern municipalities of Pétion-Ville and Kenscoff, ACLED records the expansion of the Kraze Baryè gang. The scope of the gangs has also intensified in municipalities north of the capital, while the 5 seconds, Titanyen and Canaan Gangs are looking for control of the main economic assets such as the port of Lafiteau, industrial zones and Route 1, which connects the capital to the north of the country.1
At the same time, the gangs have intensified their activities beyond the metropolitan region of Port-au-Prince and the wider department. In the Artibonite department, 2023 saw a 70% increase in deaths related to gangs compared to the previous year, with gangs such as Gran Grief de Savien, Kokorat San Ras and 5 seconds contesting the control of agricultural land and strategic road axes.2 Violence has also gained ground in other regions, although lower levels, in particular in the departments of the Center, the Grande Anse and the North in the midst of increasing clashes involving forces of the application of laws and self -defense groups seeking to contain gang activities.
In 2023, civilians continued to be targeted as part of the gang wars of gangs and territorial extensions, violence targeting civilians representing 53% of all violence related to gangs in the country. The gangs used violence to subjugate the populations residing in territories under their control or under dispute, and targeted civilians would have cooperated with rival gangs or by bypassing the authority of the gang in power. The gangs also continued to make kidnappings to generate income from ransom, although at lower levels compared to 2022. Attacks against political figures – including government representatives, judges, politicians and activists – were also twice as dead in 2023 in 2022, suggesting a growing will to target the gangs to Pressure on these gang activities.
In this context of more deadly violence targeting civilians and a general perception of the government’s inability to combat gangs, an increase in vigilant violence in 2023 added another layer to the Haiti security landscape. The reported deaths of vigilant events represent 15% of political violence in 2023. In particular, on April 24, crowds of vigilants killed at least 57 gang members in several districts of Port-au-Prince. The multiplication of these events across the country has prompted gangsters to retaliate, adding to the global increase in deadly violence in 2023.
What to monitor in 2024
Intensification and continuous propagation of the violence of gangs to new areas of the country highlights the government’s inability to combat the Haiti security crisis. The diffuse nature of violence prompted Haiti in the eight number in the Current conflict indexA significant leap compared to the past year. In 2023, ACLED also recorded a 6% decrease in clashes between state forces and armed groups, but an increase of 47% of the reported deaths. This growing lethality reflects an intensification of gang offensives against the police forces in the territories they seek to control, in particular with the targeting of police stations, but also indicates an increasing number of deaths reported among the civilians captured in the cross -fire, in particular in the densely populated neighborhoods. Vigilance groups have joined the police in the realization of anti-gang operations, resulting in a high number of deaths among the gang members. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti has also documented several cases of extrajudicial murders led by the police.3 In 2024, the Haiti police forces will continue to be subject to gang attacks as armed groups extend to new territories, and a serious shortage of personnel and equipment will likely limit the response capacity of the police and expose the civilian population to a persistent vulnerability.
The interim government of Haiti has pinned its hopes for the deployment of an international security force led by Kenya to help fight against the violence of gangs. However, after the Kenya Parliament approved the deployment, its high court blocked this decision, saying that it would make a decision in the case on January 26.4 The concerns have also remained on the history of human rights of the Kenyan police forces and their ability to effectively operate in urban circles such as the Port-au-Prince gang landscape.5 In addition, the international force will probably face a meticulous examination of the population, because many reject the legitimacy of the acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry and fear a repetition of civil murders and sexual abuses that occurred in previous peacekeeping missions.6
Any large -scale security operation will likely lead to short -lived results in the absence of measures to deal with the main engines of violence. Reforms that could lead to more sustainable results include strengthening the rule of law and capacity building of the State forces to affect weapons and drug trafficking networks, which have grown in recent years.7 Effective reforms would also seek to fight corruption and collusion with gangs within police and political sphere, which remains the main obstacle to any progress in the fight against gangs.8 Such an initiative would echo the adoption of sanctions in the United States and Canada against gang leaders and high-level politicians involved in crimes.
The adoption of lasting measures, however, remains subject to the ability of political forces to find a way to get out of the political crisis in Haiti. Although a political agreement signed on December 21, 2022 has established a roadmap for the holding of the elections in 2023, the negotiations between the political forces remain at the end.9 This impasse could lead to additional troubles in February 2024, when the new elected government had been put into office. In addition, the return to Haiti of Guy Philippe, a former rebellious leader who ousted the Aristide government in 2004, could destabilize the transition process. On January 2, surrounded by armed men, he notably called for the resignation of the interim government.10
Without the restoration of state institutions and the end of the political crisis, the gangs will continue to strengthen and professionalize. The growth and expansion of the gangs will probably continue to fuel rivalry and clashes with fatal consequences for civilians in 2024, exacerbated by the rupture of a G9 and G-Pèp truce in November 2023 and the failure of operation VIV ANSANM (live) launched in September.11
Finally, In the absence of improvements to the rule of law and the control of the flow of arms, vigilant violence will continue in the middle of the criticism that the self -defense groups have targeted the poorly identified civilians as gang members or collaborators. Experts have also stressed the risk that justicular organizations can turn to criminal activities, as observed elsewhere in Latin America.12 This risk has raised concerns that the newly emerged, a movement of vigilance, could mark a period of informal groups using an illegal force of force which will further complicate an already complex conflict landscape.
