As part of a series of security reforms pushed by the government of Mexico, the country's main civil security force has been placed under military command, extending the trend of longtime militarization in the fight against crime.
On July 1, the reforms of the National Guard law (Ley de la Guardia Nacional) entered into force, transferring the force of the Ministry of Security and Citizens (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana – SSPC) to the Ministry of Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional – Senena), where the army and the air force already operate. This decision means that Mexico has no civilian police at the national level and has four military institutions, including the Navy.
See also: Is the new National Guard of Mexico just another uniform?
The National Guard was created in 2019 during the administration of President Andrés Andrés Manuel López Obrador to replace the federal police (Federal of Politics) and serve as a first line against the outbreak of levels of criminal violence. Although he was conceived as a civilian body, he incorporated both former federal police officers and army and naval battalions and was led by commanders with military history.
This conception faced the initial promise of López Obrador to move away from the security policies led by soldiers. In practice, the National Guard has reproduced a military logic in its approach to the fight against crime, leading to repeated cases of excessive use of force and strong criticism of civil society.
The official integration of the guardian into the armed forces has raised new concerns about how it will affect coordination between the various security institutions in Mexico. Although the guard will always be responsible for implementing civil security policies, it must now respond to a military hierarchy. In addition, the armed forces have always worked with limited civil surveillance and a high degree of opacity in the management of their resources and operations.
Insight Crime spoke with Daira Araba, executive director of the world thought of Thinktank and expert in civil-military relations, to analyze the implications of the reform of public security in Mexico.
Insight Crime (IC): The National Guard has always had a strong military component, although it is a civil force. In practice, what is now changing that he is officially from Sedena control?
DAIRA ARENA (DA): First, it is an administrative and formal change in which the National Guard ceases to be part of the public security institutions and becomes another permanent army force alongside the army, the Air Force and the Navy.
Operationally, however, will change. From the start, the goalkeeper had a strong military backbone. A large part of his training, his doctrine and his organization was designed in the military framework of the State.
What will change is that, since the goalkeeper continues to perform public security functions, the armed forces will now be required to comply with standardized police reports and the first respondent protocols.
IC: How does the National Guard are part of the broader structure of the Mexico Armed Forces? Do its functions complete or overlap with others?
DA: I wouldn’t say they complement each other – they are definitively overlapping.
The National Guard is authorized to support the army and the air forces in national defense tasks, and the Air Force and the Air Force are authorized to support custody in public security operations. There is therefore a mixture of roles and missions that blurs the border between the defense and the police.
There is also a dimension inside Sedena where the National Guard is considered a sort of internal rival to the army and the air force, partly because of the incentives and advantages offered to recruit between 130,000 and 140,000 people in the guard in the context of its incorporation in Sedena.
This created an internal tension between the three forces, because the staff of the army and the Air Force feels sidelined compared to the advantages offered to the members of the Guard.
IC: Mexico's security strategy continues to rely strongly on the use of soldiers to fight against organized crime. Why does this approach remain the preference of the government?
DA: On the one hand, there is a public perception of confidence in the armed forces in the fight against crime, and this has been documented in several studies.
At the same time, the armed forces have an interest in remaining involved in these tasks. This has to do with having more budget, which, I think, is what motivated the transfer of the National Guard to Sedena. Although Sedena provided her own staff when the goalkeeper is created, having him accommodate under the SSPC meant that these positions would be paid from the SSPC budget.
Now Sedena keeps both positions and budget. The budget for federal expenses (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación) for this year shows that Sedena continues to receive significant funding increases. So yes, the armed forces have clear institutional incentives to remain involved in public security, even when their leaders publicly claim the opposite.
Civil authorities also benefit from letting the armed forces take care of the fighting with organized crime, in particular in tasks which create a short -term perception of efficiency. In some contexts, they managed to contain violence related to organized crime, at least temporarily. But in the long term, this approach did not prove to be beneficial.
IC: Should we expect the continuity of Mexico's security strategy, or does this reform represent a significant change?
DA: The legislative changes introduced so far under President Claudia Sheinbaum mark a return to the security approach of former President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), which has been criticized for years.
On the one hand, Calderón underlined the limited information and military participation while strengthening civil institutions. But his strategy was also focused on combat, with clear military nuances.
So yes, we will probably see a significant change in relation to the previous López Obrador administration, which has failed to articulate a coherent security strategy that has given real results beyond manipulation of data on homicide and crime.
But in the medium and long -term, if the Sheinbaum government does not complete its strategy with wider public policies aimed at reducing crime and violence, the results will fail.
IC: The National Guard has been accused of human rights violations and excessive appeal of force since its creation. How could this situation evolve in the new framework?
DA: The reform does not provide additional guarantees to citizens in order to prevent serious human rights violations linked to excessive use of force, torture or extrajudicial executions. Recent legal changes do not deal with the doctrine, training or underlying equipment of the guard, only its legal status and its general disciplinary system.
I do not think that the new law will necessarily lead to a sharp increase in human rights violations. But we will probably see the same models of strength to continue.
See also: Mexico depends on the army to combat crime despite human rights violations
Various studies show that, on the whole, the public does not consider human rights violations by soldiers as particularly important when they perform during security operations. What will be interesting to look at is how the evolution of corruption. Corruption is something that cares about the public, and he erodes confidence in civil and military institutions.
We are also in a period when transparency and responsibility are extremely limited. Thus, beyond the cases that enter the media, it will be increasingly difficult to follow the use of force by security institutions.
This interview has been modified for more clarity and length.
Featured image: a member of the Mexican National Guard in service just outside Mexico City, March 18, 2025. Credit: AP
