The future of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) is now closely linked to Venezuela. As long as the Venezuelan government supports the Colombian rebel group, it cannot be completely defeated and is unlikely to sign a peace deal.
The high hopes that accompanied the election of Colombian President Gustavo Petro in 2022 for a peace agreement with the ELN have been dashed. Even if no one believed his electoral promise to reach an agreement with the ELN in three months, there was real hope that the Colombian president, himself a former guerrilla, would manage to achieve what had eluded all presidents since the 1980s. However, he was doomed to failure for two reasons. He did not fully understand the ELN and did not appreciate how crucial Venezuela was to its strength and, increasingly, its identity.
*ThisThe article is the fifth in a investigation in five parts“Peace Never Had a Chance: The Colombian ELN in Venezuela,” analyzing the growth of the ELN in Venezuela and how this allowed the rebel group to project itself into Colombia. Read the full survey here.
“There are fundamental misunderstandings about the ELN and its negotiating position. They are not interested in negotiating demobilization. They want to see fundamental transformations in society. And before an agreement can be signed, the transformations must already be underway and irreversible,” said Luis Eduardo Celis, one of the ELN's oldest and most penetrating analysts.
Petro also failed to understand that today the ELN is a Colombian-Venezuelan group and that any peace agreement must inevitably include Venezuela.
“Colombia must understand that the ELN is no longer just a Colombian guerrilla group; it is now a binational organization. This means that to dismantle it there must be decisive action on both sides of the border, which will not happen until Maduro leaves power,” said Julio Borges, a longtime opposition politician and former president of the Venezuelan National Assembly.
The growth of the ELN and the survival of the Maduro regime are now linked. As long as Maduro remains in power, the privileged position enjoyed by the ELN in Venezuela appears likely to continue. Similarly, the survival of the Maduro regime is now partly linked to the growing strength of the ELN. The ELN gives the Maduro regime access to the criminal rents it needs to maintain the loyalty of senior officials and generals. It also acts as a political ally, suppressing opposition in its area of influence, it acts as a bulwark against any aggression coming from Colombia and, more recently, it could act as a deterrent against any possible US invasion.
To date, everything indicates that the American deployment in the Caribbean, although presented as a counter-narcotics operation, is in reality aimed at regime change in Venezuela.
Indeed, US strikes against suspected drug boats have sought to draw the ELN into the current dynamics of drug trafficking, according to a statement from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth:
What could influence U.S. thinking regarding any intervention in Venezuela is that the ELN could form an insurgency in Venezuela in the event of a regime change.
Since its creation in the early 1960s, the ELN has been engaged in a low-intensity war against the Colombian state. Since 1999 and the establishment of the Plan Colombia assistance program, the United States has devoted more than $10 billion in aid to Colombia, much of it directed against the country's illegal actors, including the ELN. Yet the ELN is stronger today than it has ever been, revealing its resilience even in the face of a US-backed army. The ELN's deployment in Venezuela now extends to eight of the 24 states. While the ELN is currently a pro-regime paramilitary force in Venezuela, in the event of a regime change, could it become an insurgent force there, as is the case in Colombia?
“The ELN is formally committed to defending the 'Bolivarian Revolution' in Venezuela and has a vested interest in resisting its fall and the installation of any government determined to restore the rule of law and establish territorial control. It could end up waging a low-intensity war against a future anti-Chavista government,” said former US Ambassador to Venezuela James Story.
Although the future of the ELN and the Maduro regime is clearly linked, the ELN's presence in Venezuela would survive the fall of the Maduro regime. The rebel group is now so firmly entrenched in several Venezuelan states – including Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Amazonas – and enjoys near-legitimate status, political support at all state levels, and even the support of some local communities, that its eradication would require sustained statewide offensives. Any new government in Caracas, especially if it could not count on the cooperation of formerly Chavista elements, would find it difficult, if not impossible, to expel the ELN, at least in the short term.
Under current conditions, the ELN is expected to continue to strengthen in Venezuela and only needs the criminal conquest of the Venezuelan state of Amazonas to consolidate its control over the entire 2,219 kilometers of border between Colombia and Venezuela. From there, it can project deep into Colombia and continue to supply its units scattered throughout the country, while keeping its logistical networks, its training infrastructure and much of its leadership, beyond the reach of Colombian security forces.
The ELN's growing revenues, not only from the cocaine trade but also from illegal gold mining, extortion and smuggling, mean that it has ample funds for future expansion. The potential revenue from drug trafficking in Catatumbo, estimated at $600 million per year, would alone be enough to sustain the ELN indefinitely. And Venezuela has gone from being a simple sanctuary to a source of income. The ELN now earns millions on both sides of the border.
Another failure of Petro's government was the increase in the cocaine trade and the growth of almost all of Colombia's illegal actors, including the ELN. Current estimates put the number of ELN members at 6,450. Colombia's next president will face a series of reinvigorated illegal armed groups and criminal economies. The ELN has the added advantage of Venezuela, making it the most difficult illegal army to combat effectively.
SEE ALSO: The Colombian-Venezuelan guerrillas: how the Colombian war migrated to Venezuela
The possibilities of a US-led regime change could actually benefit the ELN. Any new government, especially the opposition one, will have difficulty governing after more than two decades of exclusion from power. Its only tools to fight the ELN will be the same soldiers who today work alongside the Colombian rebels and profit from them.
A longtime analyst in Caracas, who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons, summed up the situation:
“Venezuela is teeming with non-state armed groups of all kinds, all invested in the status quo and all heavily armed. Even if the FANB (Venezuelan Armed Forces) remains united and opts for allegiance to a new government (by no means guaranteed), internal security will be a major problem. Conditions are ripe for a protracted, low-intensity war if a transition is not fully negotiated. A sudden change would be very destabilizing in almost any scenario. A predictable scenario.”
After more than 60 years, the prospects of the ELN, both in Colombia and Venezuela, seem brighter than ever.
