The Commander-in-Chief of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro, aka “Antonio García,” appeared furious after Colombian President Gustavo Petro alluded to guerrilla involvement in drug trafficking.
“The ELN has never been linked to drug trafficking. In the future, all these lies will collapse. That time will come,” Antonio García said in a statement. official press release drawn on September 1st.
*ThisThe article is the second in a investigation in five parts“Peace Never Had a Chance: The Colombian ELN in Venezuela,” analyzing the growth of the ELN in Venezuela and how this allowed the rebel group to project itself into Colombia. Read the full survey here.
Founded in the 1960s as a Marxist-Leninist group with roots in liberation theology, the ELN leadership has always sought to prevent drug trafficking from being an ideological aberration. Yet the ELN's position began to weaken in recent decades, as the lure of easy money to fuel the revolution took precedence over ideological purity. Some rebel units or fronts began to impose a taxknown as grammaron Colombian coca producers who worked in the territories it controlled. But the ELN continues to insist that it is not directly involved in purchasing, processing or transporting cocaine and makes only a relatively small amount of money from this activity. grammar.
“We charge a small tax that helps us solve the problems of food and clothing,” said alias “Ricardo”, commander of the ELN Northeast War Front. The times in July.
The forceful and consistent denials belie the reality that drug trafficking has become a key source of income for the ELN. Its profits support the existence of several of its fronts, notably those along the Colombia-Venezuela border. And with increasing military pressure from the Colombian side, the group appears to be moving its operations to eastern Venezuela, where it maintains a collaborative relationship with authorities.
The ELN has now reportedly expanded its activities to operating its own cocaine laboratories and supervising the transportation of the drug across borders. The group's seizure of Colombia's coca-rich Catatumbo border region in early 2025 was a significant step in a broader, planned expansion of drug trafficking, likely in tandem with elements of President Nicolas Maduro's regime.
Vertical integration
Control of the Colombia-Venezuela border region is essential to maximizing profits from the drug trade, as it allows the ELN to control every step of the process, from production to wholesale. It also allows the ELN to project deep into Colombia from Venezuela, beyond the reach of Colombian security forces and their U.S. allies.
The border region has a high concentration of coca crops, cocaine processing laboratories and trafficking routes that supply international consumer markets.
The ELN's January takeover of Colombia's Catatumbo region gave it control of one of the most productive coca-growing areas in the world. Across the border, in the Venezuelan state of Zulia, coca cultivation remains wild. nascent stagebut sources told InSight Crime that the ELN is recruiting farmers in Venezuela to harvest coca on both sides of the border.
SEE ALSO: Venezuela and the ELN's love-hate relationship with drug trafficking
The regulation of this market and the control of border corridors are managed by the Structure of Finances and Savings for the Revolution (EFER) of the ELN, according to Colombian President Gustavo Petro. This specialized division functions as the financial arm of the Northeastern War Front in Catatumbo, responsible for coordinating drug trafficking operations on both sides of the border. Its functions would range from the creation of cocaine laboratories to the channeling of illicit funds, all regulated by a specific set of rules.
As Colombian authorities step up military pressure against the ELN, the group's presence in Venezuela has allowed it to move drug production out of reach, across the border.
Continued raids on ELN drug processing laboratories in Colombia have pushed guerrillas to set up facilities in remote areas of Venezuela, such as the border town of Jesus Maria Semprúnwhere they act as de facto authorities.
Cocaine produced on the Colombian side passes easily through ELN-controlled territory to Venezuela. Then, along with the cocaine produced domestically, it is sent to consumer markets. Drugs usually pass through Zulia via Lake Maracaibo, which empties into the Caribbean Sea. Shipments also depart from the shores of the neighboring state of Falcon. Shipments often head to the islands of Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao before being shipped to Europe. Others are sent further east for shipment from the coastal states of Carabobo and La Guaira to neighboring Caribbean islands, while others are flown directly from clandestine Zulia airstrips to Central America.
Alternative routes from Venezuela to the Caribbean include flights sent to the islands from the border state of Apure or that follow the course of the Orinoco River, which passes through the states of Amazonas, Apure, Bolívar, Guárico and Anzoátegui, along many points controlled by the ELN. It then flows into the Atlantic Ocean.
Cross-border control
Zulia's northernmost municipality, Guajira, offers an example of the importance of the ELN's binational presence and social control to its drug trafficking activities – as well as its complicated relationship with Venezuelan authorities.
Traffickers are increasingly turning to Guajira as security forces along other routes have begun demanding higher fees to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking. While Machiques de Perijá, the municipality north of Jesús María Semprún, was once a popular route for shipping drugs to Lake Maracaibo, sending illicit shipments to Guajira, which sits directly on the Caribbean, now appears to be a more economical option.
“It became almost impossible for drug traffickers to transport drugs because it became too expensive,” an agricultural producer from Machiques de Perijá told InSight Crime. “All the authorities wanted their share.”
A legacy of state neglect and abuses by security forces in Guajira laid the foundations that allowed the ELN to gain a perception of quasi-legitimacy among segments of the local population. Additionally, Maduro loyalists dominate local politics, meaning they are unlikely to cause problems for Maduro's guerrilla ally and might even turn to them for help in elections.
Multiple sources told InSight Crime that the ELN uses the town of Maicao, in Colombia's La Guajira department, as an operational hub for sending drugs to La Guajira in Venezuela. The Venezuelan city's sparse population, large porous border with Colombia and extensive coastline make it an ideal location for traffickers sending drugs to islands in the Caribbean or Central America.
The recent discovery The story of a semi-submersible ship partly built in a Guajira artisanal shipyard suggests that the municipality may even have become the departure point for drugs sent directly to Europe, given that some drug-trafficking submarines are now capable of transatlantic voyages.
A double-edged sword
Drug trafficking is a key part of the ELN's relationship with Maduro's regime, which is mutually beneficial, although in some respects the government retains the upper hand. The ELN pays in services and cash for protection in order to operate in Venezuelan territory.
The ELN offers multiple benefits to the Venezuelan government. In areas like Guajira, where the state is weak, the ELN maintains order. Additionally, the group has interfered In elections with the aim of supporting candidates loyal to Maduro's political party. Its presence along the border also serves as a buffer and early warning against a possible Colombian invasion.
Most importantly, the bribes that drug traffickers pay to security forces indirectly help ensure that Maduro remains in power.
The system is now known as the Cartel of the Suns. This is less of a drug trafficking organization and more of a description of a widespread corrupt practice. The government guarantees the loyalty of an army it cannot afford to pay living wage by allowing officials to enrich themselves through bribes from drug traffickers or even by directly participating in the trade.
SEE ALSO: Beyond the Cartel of Suns
In this sense, the interests of Maduro and the ELN align. Venezuela's financially troubled government stands to gain from its ally controlling the entire drug trafficking chain, because it means more illicit profits can be pumped into a corrupt state apparatus. A stronger ELN also offers more potential power to a Maduro regime plagued by a lack of domestic legitimacy and growing geopolitical pressures.
The ELN's ultimate goal is to become the sole dominant criminal actor along the entire Colombia-Venezuela border. With Venezuela's protection, this goal seems within reach. And it goes beyond drug trafficking to include the reproduction of the popular political model developed over six decades in Colombia, but now used in Venezuela.
